Omitir los comandos de cinta
Saltar al contenido principal
Inicio de sesión
Universidad EAFIT
Carrera 49 # 7 sur -50 Medellín Antioquia Colombia
Carrera 12 # 96-23, oficina 304 Bogotá Cundinamarca Colombia
(57)(4) 2619500 contacto@eafit.edu.co
EAFITEscuelasEscuela de Finanzas, Economía y GobiernoEscuela de Finanzas, Economía y Gobierno / NoticiasSeminario - Information Frictions in Securitization Markets: Investor Sophistication or Asset Opacity?

Eventos / 18/01/2018

Information Frictions in Securitization Markets: Investor Sophistication or Asset Opacity?

EXPOSITOR

David Echeverry, Ph.D.

Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley, Estados Unidos
Más información clic aquí


Fecha: jueves 18 de enero de 2018
Hora: 4:00 p.m - 5:20 p.m. 
Lugar: Bloque 19, auditorio 704, Universidad EAFIT
Entrada libre

​Abstract

The performance of a security backed by a pool of loans is affected by default correlation, and not only the probability of default. I imply default correlation from the market price of collateralized mortgage obligations. Implied correlations are informative about subsequent bond downgrades, but this information content depends on the quality of documentation on the underlying loans. Correlations implied from junior tranches are no more informative than those of AAA tranches for "low-doc" deals, and the latter no less informative than the former for "full-doc" deals. Errors in computing default correlations were thus not driven by AAA investors but rather by "low-doc" investors. Moreover, regulation aiming for market transparency through better loan documentation can be more effective than the one aiming to curb the principal-agent problem.

Ver artículo completo

Correlation_expectation.pdf

Última modificación: 11/07/2019 15:25

Escriba su opinión sobre este artículo