Abstract
Public entities often grant concession rights to private firms for the provision of public services. The design of these contracts has important implications for cost efficiency. While the regulator is interested in giving the best incentives, it also wants to maintain the flexibility of replacing the private operator. In this paper, we analyze empirically this type of contracts. We start by constructing a structural model of the game played by a regulator (the principal) and a private operator (the agent). The model incorporates typical features of these contracts such as adverse selection, moral hazard and dynamic investment decisions in assets specific to the relation. We then show how to identify and estimate this model using panel data from French public transportation contracts. Our counterfactual experiments compute welfare under the first best and alternative contract designs.
Co-autores: Kei Kawai (University of California-Berkeley) y Andre Trindade (Getulio Vargas Foundation)
Acerca del expositor
Guillermo Diaz es Doctor en Economía de Northwestern University. Economista de la Universidad del Pacifico y Magíster en Economía de la Universidad de Chile, Guillermo actualmente trabaja como profesor e investigador en CENTRUM Católica Graduate Business School (Perú). Su investigación se concentra en el área de microeconomía aplicada y organización industrial, con un énfasis en el estudio empírico de contratos regulatorios y el análisis de los determinantes de la productividad de las firmas. Ha publicado en revistas académicas como el Journal of Public Economics y el Journal of Regulatory Economics.