Abstract
We Prior to a collective binary choice, members of a group receive binary signals correlated with the better option. Expanding membership may provide no benefit, but expertise is everywhere beneficial. If the group ignores any statistical dependence among the signals, as through majority vote, an expert may perform better than the group. If the group accounts for dependence, a relatively expert member puts an upper bound on the probability of a false belief. The bound holds for any group size and signal distribution. Furthermore, a population investing in expertise is better off cultivating a small mass of elites than adopting an egalitarian policy.
Acerca del expositor
Alexander Lundberg es Profesor del departamento de Economía en West Virginia University y Ph.D en economía de Emory University, M.Sc en Econometría y Matemáticas de London School of Economics, B.Sc en Matemáticas de Christopher Newport University. Entre sus temas de interés están Economía pública, Microeconomía y Regulación Económica.